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 Pleading for privilege 
Denials and non-admissions under the UCPR 
This case provides practitioners with useful guidance on the relationship between the 
privileges against self-incrimination and exposure to a penalty, and the UCPR requirements 
for denials and non-admissions. 
 
Pleading – self-incrimination and penalty privilege – answering pleadings under UCPR – 
denials and non-admissions – how privilege should be claimed 
In ASIC v Managed Investments Ltd No.3 [2012] QSC 74, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) applied for orders striking out paragraphs of the defences, 
primarily on the basis that they did not comply with the requirements of the Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR). 
It was argued that, for most of these paragraphs, the non-compliance was not justified by 
claims to privilege against self-incrimination or exposure to a penalty. 
Facts 
The matter was commenced by application in late October 2009 against three corporations 
and five individuals alleged to have been directors or officers of the corporations or 
associated entities. ASIC alleged contraventions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and  
sought orders which amounted to civil penalties. 
Orders made on 7 December 2009 by consent included an order that the proceeding 
continue as if started by claim. Order 10 of these orders purported to enable the individual 
defendants to make a claim of privilege against self-incrimination or exposure to penalties 
by directing: 
“So far as is necessary to allow the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth respondents to 
make a claim of privilege against self-incrimination or exposure to penalties, it is directed 
that the defences filed by the respondents herein need not comply with the pleading rules 
of the UCPR, in respect of those parts of the defences where such a claim is made.” 
Several disputes about the statement of claim followed, with a fourth version filed on 21 
February 2012. 
ASIC applied for orders striking out paragraphs of the defences of the individual defendants, 
and directing compliance with specified parts of the UCPR. 
It would be necessary for the defences to be amended in light of the latest statement of 
claim. However, as it was common ground that the issues arising on the application would 
arise under the amended defences of the individual defendants unless some order was 
made, there was utility in deciding the issues to the extent possible before the defences 
were amended. 
Legislation: UCPR rr165, 166 
Rule 165(1) of the UCPR (Answering pleadings) provides: 
165(1) A party may, in response to a pleading, plead a denial, a non-admission, an 
admission or another matter. 
(2) A party who pleads a non-admission may not give or call evidence in relation to a 
fact not admitted, unless the evidence relates to another part of the party’s 
pleading. 
 
Rule 166 of the UCPR (Denials and non-admissions) provides, so far as relevant: 
166(1) An allegation of fact made by a party in a pleading is taken to be admitted by 
an opposite party required to plead to the pleading unless— 
(a) the allegation is denied or stated to be not admitted by the opposite party 
in a pleading; or… 
(3) A party may plead a non-admission only if— 
(a) the party has made inquiries to find out whether the allegation is true or 
untrue; and 
(b) the inquiries for an allegation are reasonable having regard to the time 
limited for filing and serving the defence or other pleading in which the 
denial or non-admission of the allegation is contained; and 
(c) the party remains uncertain as to the truth or falsity of the allegation. 
(4) A party's denial or non-admission of an allegation of fact must be accompanied 
by a direct explanation for the party's belief that the allegation is untrue or can not 
be admitted. 
(5) If a party's denial or non-admission of an allegation does not comply with subrule 
(4), the party is taken to have admitted the allegation. 
Description of parties 
As a preliminary matter, Fryberg J noted that once the order had been made that the 
proceeding continue as if started by claim, the parties should in subsequent documents be 
referred to as plaintiff and defendant. This had not always happened and his Honour 
directed that in future documents should describe the parties in that way. 
Revocation of order 10 of orders of 7 December 
In the course of the argument, Fryberg J revoked order 10 of the orders made on 7 
December 2009. His Honour found that the order was causing confusion and argument 
because of its indiscriminate application to all defendants, and because it failed to make it 
clear what was necessary to allow a claim to privilege. 
The judge regarded it as necessary to provide instead: “a pleading regime which was more 
nuanced, which delivered greater precision in identifying the rules (if any) to be disapplied 
and which differentiated among the defendants”. 
General application of self-incrimination and penalty privileges to pleadings 
ASIC submitted that that the relevant privilege did not give rise to a blanket dispensation 
from the operation of the rules of pleading. It submitted that the privilege would be allowed 
to apply in relation to allegations central to the circumstances giving rise to the 
contraventions, but not to allegations relating to peripheral matters. 
Fryberg J rejected the submission. He referred to the analysis of the law relating to the 
privileges against incrimination and self-exposure to a penalty in Trade Practices 
Commission v Abbco Ice Works Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1279, and found that the distinction 
urged by ASIC would run counter to the principle on which these privileges were based. 
Privilege claim – sixth defendant 
Several paragraphs of the defence of the sixth defendant were in the form typified by para 
2(e): "The sixth respondent does not admit or deny paragraphs .... on the basis of his 
privilege against self-incrimination and self-exposure to penalties." 
Fryberg J was satisfied the allegations in the paragraphs of the statement of claim referred 
to would, if proved, tend to expose the sixth defendant to a penalty. Accordingly, any 
obligation to admit the allegations imposed by the UCPR would deprive him of penalty 
privilege. 
His Honour referred to the decision of the High Court in Reid v Howard [1995] HCA 40 at 6, 
and said that same consequence would follow from any obligation to plead in such a way as 
to expose the sixth defendant to “the risk that indirect or derivative evidence, being 
evidence obtained by using the material disclosed … as a basis of investigation” could be 
tendered against him.  
The judge extracted statements from the decision of Finkelstein J in  Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission v Mining Projects Group Limited [2007] FCA 1620 at 12, 
including: 
“… although in a civil action a defendant is required to deliver a defence he cannot 
be compelled to make any admissions in relation to the matters alleged against him. 
That is, penalty privilege operates to relieve a defendant from the need to deliver a 
defence that complies with the pleading rules if the rules would override the 
privilege. To the extent that pleading rules purport to impose such an obligation they 
must give way to the privilege [Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy 
Union [2005] FCA 1453; (2005) 146 IR 106, 111-112; [2005] FCA 1658; (2005) 226 
ALR 247, 251.]" (emphasis added) 
  
Fryberg J explained that the words emphasised in that passage are words of limitation and 
that the privilege affords relief from the pleading rules only if the rules would override the 
privilege. In any given case it is necessary to identify the relevant rules, to determine what 
those rules require the responding pleader to do in respect of the particular allegation 
made, and to determine the extent to which that requirement is inconsistent with the 
privilege. 
  
On this approach, Fryberg J found that the net effect of rr165 and 166 of the UCPR is that a 
responding party is required or deemed to admit an allegation unless he or she is uncertain 
as to its truth or falsity or believes it to be untrue. Since the form of pleading adopted by the 
sixth defendant was clearly in breach of r165(1), it was necessary to determine whether this 
was justified by the claim of penalty privilege. 
The judge considered the permissible pleading options available to the sixth defendant as 
depending on whether or not he believed the particular allegation to which he was pleading 
to be true: 
Allegations believed to be true 
In relation to allegations believed to be true, the judge said the choices available were to 
either waive the privilege and admit the allegations, or refuse to plead to the allegations, 
relying on the privilege. He said it was not permissible under the rules to not admit, or to 
deny those allegations. 
The judge found that the penalty privilege would relieve the sixth defendant of any 
obligation to admit the allegations and would also override any deemed admission under 
r166(1) of the UCPR. In such a case the claim should be made in relation to specific 
allegations in the statement of claim. The judge also said that if the claim was upheld or not 
challenged, it would presumably be necessary to exempt the plea from the operation of 
r166(1). 
Allegations not believed to be true 
 
The submission for the sixth defendant that the incrimination privilege entitled him to 
refuse to plead non-admissions or denials was rejected. Fryberg J said (at [25]): 
 
“Once it is accepted that pleading a denial or non-admission neither assists the proof of the 
claim for a penalty nor points toward a further line of enquiry, there is in my judgment no 
scope for the privilege to operate.” 
 
The judge concluded that the privilege did not apply to a pleading in response to allegations 
which were not believed to be true, whether because of uncertainty about the truth or 
falsity of the allegation, or because it was believed to be untrue and that in such a case the 
pleading must comply must comply with r165 of the UCPR.  
 
Privilege claim – seventh defendant 
Paragraph 4 of the defence of the seventh defendant pleaded: 
“4. The seventh respondent denies paragraphs … of the third further amended statement of 
claim but does not provide a direct explanation for the denial because of the seventh 
respondent’s claim of privilege against self-incrimination or exposure to penalties.” 
ASIC challenged this paragraph of the defence on the ground of failure to comply with 
r166(4) of the UCPR. 
Fryberg J concluded that the assertion of privilege as the reason for the failure “to provide a 
direct explanation for the denial” disclosed a misreading of r166(4). His Honour said that the 
explanation required by the rule was for the party’s belief that the allegation was untrue not 
for the denial, and that the focus was on the state of mind of the party at the time of the 
pleading. As to the form of the required explanation, his Honour suggested that something 
along the lines of: “I have made reasonable enquiries as to whether the allegation is true 
and I believe it to be untrue as a result of the information which I have obtained thereby” 
would be adequate. 
The judge noted that it became apparent during the course of submissions that the defence 
of the seventh defendant had been drawn on the basis that order 10 of the orders of 7 
December 2009 entitled a defendant to deny allegations known to be true. It would be 
impossible for a defendant making a denial in such circumstances to provide an explanation 
for the belief that the allegation was untrue because the defendant would have no such 
belief. In that context, his Honour confirmed his earlier finding that r166(4) makes it clear 
that an allegation may be denied only where the party believes it to be untrue.  
There was a submission for the seventh defendant that there would necessarily be 
occasions when the explanation required by r166(4) of the UCPR would assist in the proof of 
the case against him. 
Fryberg J accepted that there was a theoretical possibility that the requirement to provide 
the explanation for a non-admission, or perhaps also a denial, could infringe penalty 
privilege or privilege against self-incrimination. His Honour suggested that, if such a 
situation arose when the eighth defendant’s defence was re-drafted, the privilege could be 
claimed to avoid giving an explanation in respect of the specific allegation. It would then be 
possible to determine whether it was properly claimed. If it was, an order could be made to 
exempt the failure to provide an explanation from the operation of r166(5). 
Other defences  
A number of paragraphs in the defence of the eighth defendant adopted the template: 
“As to paragraph … of the statement of claim, the eighth respondent: 
(a) Admits that… 
(b) Otherwise denies paragraph … because the allegations are untrue.” 
ASIC submitted that the explanation in that form did not comply with the requirements of 
the r166(4) of the UCPR, with the consequence that the allegations were taken to be 
admitted. Fryberg J found this submission to be correct. 
The judge said that the rule provided that a denial must be accompanied by an explanation 
for the party’s belief, not an explanation of why the party had denied the relevant 
allegations. His Honour suggested the following as an acceptable format to follow the denial 
in subparagraph (b): 
“Explanation for belief 
The eighth defendant believes the allegations are untrue because [state reason].” 
His Honour also suggested that the pleader should have regard to the statements of 
Daubney J on this topic in Cape York Airlines Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited 
[2009] 1 QdR 116 at 124 when the matter was repleaded in the further defence. 
Fryberg J also discussed issues raised in relation to the defences of the fourth and fifth 
defendants. Several of these issues were similar to those which had been discussed in 
relation to one or more of the other defendants. The judge declined to strike out particular 
parts of these pleadings on the basis that the rulings already made would be taken into 
account in drawing the amended defences. 
Orders 
 
It was ordered that para 2(e) of the defence of the sixth defendant be struck out, with 
liberty to replead. (It was accepted that the ruling would apply to many other paragraphs of 
the defence which adopted the same formulation, and that the amended defence which 
was required in any event could be drafted in the light of the specific ruling.) 
Para (4) of the defence of the seventh defendant was also struck out, with liberty to 
replead. 
Comment 
The focus of most analysis of the privileges against self-incrimination and exposure to a 
penalty has been in the context of its application to general disclosure obligations. 
This case provides valuable practical guidance for practitioners on the interaction between 
these privileges and the unique requirements applying to denials and non-admissions in 
Queensland under the UCPR. 
 
 
 
 
